109 ideas
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
8721 | An 'impredicative' definition seems circular, because it uses the term being defined [Friend] |
8680 | Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend] |
3678 | Reductio ad absurdum proves an idea by showing that its denial produces contradiction [Friend] |
8705 | Anti-realists see truth as our servant, and epistemically contrained [Friend] |
8713 | In classical/realist logic the connectives are defined by truth-tables [Friend] |
8708 | Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend] |
8694 | Free logic was developed for fictional or non-existent objects [Friend] |
8665 | A 'proper subset' of A contains only members of A, but not all of them [Friend] |
8672 | A 'powerset' is all the subsets of a set [Friend] |
8677 | Set theory makes a minimum ontological claim, that the empty set exists [Friend] |
8666 | Infinite sets correspond one-to-one with a subset [Friend] |
8682 | Major set theories differ in their axioms, and also over the additional axioms of choice and infinity [Friend] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
8709 | The law of excluded middle is syntactic; it just says A or not-A, not whether they are true or false [Friend] |
8711 | Intuitionists read the universal quantifier as "we have a procedure for checking every..." [Friend] |
8675 | Paradoxes can be solved by talking more loosely of 'classes' instead of 'sets' [Friend] |
8674 | The Burali-Forti paradox asks whether the set of all ordinals is itself an ordinal [Friend] |
8667 | The 'integers' are the positive and negative natural numbers, plus zero [Friend] |
8668 | The 'rational' numbers are those representable as fractions [Friend] |
8670 | A number is 'irrational' if it cannot be represented as a fraction [Friend] |
8661 | The natural numbers are primitive, and the ordinals are up one level of abstraction [Friend] |
8664 | Cardinal numbers answer 'how many?', with the order being irrelevant [Friend] |
8671 | The 'real' numbers (rationals and irrationals combined) is the Continuum, which has no gaps [Friend] |
8663 | Raising omega to successive powers of omega reveal an infinity of infinities [Friend] |
8662 | The first limit ordinal is omega (greater, but without predecessor), and the second is twice-omega [Friend] |
8669 | Between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers [Friend] |
8676 | Is mathematics based on sets, types, categories, models or topology? [Friend] |
8678 | Most mathematical theories can be translated into the language of set theory [Friend] |
8701 | The number 8 in isolation from the other numbers is of no interest [Friend] |
8702 | In structuralism the number 8 is not quite the same in different structures, only equivalent [Friend] |
8699 | Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)? [Friend] |
8696 | Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend] |
8695 | Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend] |
8700 | 'In re' structuralism says that the process of abstraction is pattern-spotting [Friend] |
8681 | The big problem for platonists is epistemic: how do we perceive, intuit, know or detect mathematical facts? [Friend] |
8712 | Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend] |
8716 | Formalism is unconstrained, so cannot indicate importance, or directions for research [Friend] |
8706 | Constructivism rejects too much mathematics [Friend] |
8707 | Intuitionists typically retain bivalence but reject the law of excluded middle [Friend] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
8704 | Structuralists call a mathematical 'object' simply a 'place in a structure' [Friend] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
8685 | Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend] |
8688 | Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend] |
7357 | People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
7358 | All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
7362 | Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
7360 | Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
7359 | Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
7363 | The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
7361 | Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
23393 | Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |